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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the authentication prob-
lem where a candidate measurement presented by an unidentified
user is compared to a previously stored measurement of the
legitimate user, the enrollment, with respect to a certain distortion
criteria for authentication. An adversary wishes to impersonate
the legitimate user by guessing the enrollment until the system au-
thenticates him. For this setting, we study the minimum number
of required guesses (on average) by the adversary for a successful
impersonation attack and find the complete characterization
of the asymptotic exponent of this metric, referred to as the
deception exponent. Our result is a direct application of the results
of the Guessing problem by Arikan and Merhav [19]. Paralleling
the work in [19] we also extend this result to the case where
the adversary may have access to additional side information
correlated to the enrollment data.
The paper is a revised version of a submission to IEEE WIFS
2015, with the referencing to the paper [19] clarified compared
with the conference version.
I. INTRODUCTION
Societal development will lead to changes in the way
communication systems are used. Devices are becoming more
and more connected to one another through massive distributed
networks. These devices may contain sensitive data such as
personal, commercial, or even military information. There-
fore, securing access to such contents using authentication
techniques that limits the access to legitimate users is of
high importance, especially with the increasing rate at which
manipulating digital information with complicated methods,
which require only low-cost systems, becomes easier.
Motivated by these concerns, we study an authentication
problem, depicted in Figure 1, from an information-theoretic
perspective. In the authentication system considered in this
paper, a candidate measurement presented by an unidentified
user for authentication is compared to a previously stored
measurement of the legitimate user which is referred to as
the enrollment. The output of the system is a binary decision
that identifies whether the user is legitimate or malicious. This
authentication system can be used in variety of applications
such as biometric systems (see e.g., [1] and [2]), where
measurements are biometric features like fingerprints, or, more
generally, it can be used in high-dimensional database systems
(see e.g., [3]).
Due to the inherent randomness in the measurement envi-
ronment or the use of different hardware, measurements are
often noisy. Therefore, the authentication system should be
designed such that it tolerates a certain level of distortion
authenticator
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check if:
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the authentication system.
between the measurement in the authentication phase and the
enrollment phase.
We assume that there exists a malicious user whose goal
is to deceive the authentication system by impersonating
the legitimate user. This malicious user can potentially have
access to some additional side information correlated to the
enrollment data. The strategy of the adversary is to present a
series of guesses of the enrollment until he is authenticated,
i.e., the distortion between his guess and the enrollment falls
below the required distortion limit which is predetermined in
the system. In this paper, we provide an assessment of the
vulnerability of such authentication system.
A. Related Work and Contributions
In authentication problems, one of the main information-
theoretic performance metrics of interest is the success proba-
bility of the adversary, i.e., the probability of false-acceptance
in the system. The initial work on characterizing the proba-
bility of false-acceptance is [4], where the authors studied a
system in which the enrollment data is compressed and stored
to be compared with later measurements by the authenticator
with respect to a certain distortion criteria. In the case of
independent measurement and enrollment data, the trade-off
between the compression rate and the exponent of the false-
acceptance probability was characterized. However, for the
case of correlated measurement and enrollment data, which
corresponds to availability of additional side information at
the adversary, inner and outer bounds were derived which did
not match.
Another approach for authentication was considered in [5]
and [6], where the authentication problem was modeled as
a statistical hypothesis testing problem. Then, the exponent
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of false-acceptance probability was bounded using a large
deviation approach.
A closely related problem to [4] has been investigated in
the literature in the context of database queries, where the
focus is not on authenticating a user, but to identify if a given
measurement is similar to the compressed enrollment stored in
the database. Authors in [7] characterized the maximum rate of
enrollments that can be reliably identified in the database, and
extended the results in [8] to the case where reconstruction of
the enrollment is also required. In addition, for some special
cases of this problem, the exponent of the false-acceptance
probability is characterized. These results can be found in
[3] for the quadratic Gaussian case, in [9] for the case when
no distortion is allowed, i.e., exact match is required, and in
[10] for the case of binary symmetric source with Hamming
distortion.
The authors in [11] studied the authentication problem in
the context of biometric systems and determined the exponent
of the false-acceptance probability with compressed and un-
compressed enrollment data when the adversary has no side
information. For the case of an adversary with side information
and uncompressed enrollment, the authors in [12] derived the
optimal false-acceptance exponent.
In a different line of work, authentication is considered in
a communication setting, when a user transmits a message to
a receiver. This type of authentication is referred to as mes-
sage authentication. Here authentication is performed using
a shared secret key which is not available to the adversary.
The study of information-theoretic performance limits for this
setting was initiated in [13] and has been followed up to this
date, see for instance [14-18] and references therein. However,
we do not consider message authentication or the use of a
secret key in our current study.
In this paper, we study the authentication problem with
respect to a certain distortion limit in which the adversary
tries to authenticate himself in the system by guessing the
(uncompressed) enrollment sequence. Our performance metric
is different from those considered in the prior works in
authentication; We consider the average number of guesses
that the adversary needs to make to successfully deceive the
authentication system, and completely determine the asymp-
totic exponent of this metric. Our work is a direct application
of the results of the Guessing problem in [19]. This result is of
interest in the design of the authentication systems as it char-
acterizes the minimum required complexity (on average) of an
adversary for successful deception in the system. Furthermore,
we extend our result to the case where the adversary has access
to additional side information correlated to the enrollment.
B. Notations and Organization
In this paper, we use capital letters to indicate a random
variable, small letters to indicate realization of a random
variable, calligraphic letters to denote a set, e.g., X , and |X | to
indicate the cardinality of the set. The notation Xn denotes the
length-n sequence {X1, . . . , Xn}. A probability distribution
on X is denoted by P, i.e., P := {P(x), x ∈ X}. Moreover,
the probability of the sequence xn is denoted by Pn(xn).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we describe the problem settings along with the definitions.
The main result on the characterization of the deception
exponent is presented in Section III and the proofs are given in
Section IV. In Section V, we consider an extension of the prob-
lem in which the adversary has access to some additional side
information correlated to the enrollment. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM SETTINGS AND DEFINITIONS
Consider an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
random memoryless source sequence Xn generated according
to the distribution P defined on a finite alphabet X . Here,
n corresponds to the measurement length and the sequence
represents the enrollment in the system based on which users
are authenticated. Denote the reconstruction alphabet by Y
and let d : X × Y → [0, dmax] be a finite distortion measure.
We define the component-wise mean distortion between two
sequences xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn as
d(n)(xn, yn) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(xi, yi). (1)
Recall that in lossy source coding of a discrete memoryless
source X with distribution Q and a distortion measure d, the
rate-distortion function R(D,Q) defined as the infimum of all
achievable rates for a given distortion D [20, Theorem 7.3] is
given by
R(D,Q) = min
P(y|x):E[d(X,Y )]≤D
I(X;Y ), (2)
where it is assumed that for every x ∈ X , there exists a
reconstruction symbol y ∈ Y such that
d(x, y) = 0. (3)
In the authentication system considered in this paper, a
user is authenticated as legitimate if the distortion between
the provided sequence at the authentication step and the
enrollment is below a predefined limit D.
Now, assume that a malicious user tries to launch an
impersonation attack by guessing the enrollment sequence xn
with a certain strategy as follows. For every measurement
length n, the adversary has a strategy S(n) ⊆ Yn which is
an ordered set of n-length sequences (guesses) yn(j) ∈ Yn
with j = {1, 2, . . . }, that is,
S(n) := {yn(1), yn(2), . . .}. (4)
Using this strategy, the adversary produces a sequence of
guesses until a guess yn(j) is found such that
d(n)
(
xn, yn(j)
) ≤ D, (5)
which leads to the adversary being authenticated by the
system.
Remark 1: There always exists a strategy for the adversary
that leads to authentication. This stems from the fact that
one strategy could be the set of all possible sequences in the
reconstruction domain Yn, and based on the assumption in (3),
there is always a guess that satisfies any required distortion
constraint D ≥ 0 for authentication.
Define the counting function G(n)(·) of the adversary as
the function that for a given enrollment sequence xn ∈ Xn
returns the index j of the first guess yn(j) ∈ S(n) such that
d(n)(xn, yn(j)) ≤ D. If no such a guess exists, it returns
G(n)(xn)=∞.
Definition 1: The deception exponent under the distortion
constraint D is defined as
E(D) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
min
S(n)
logEP
[
G(n)(Xn)
]
. (6)
♦
The above definition characterizes the asymptotic exponent
of the average number of guesses that the adversary needs to
make with its best possible (optimal) strategy such that he is
authenticated by the system. This can be used for adjusting the
distortion constraint D so as to limit the adversarial success.
III. MAIN RESULT
The main result of this paper is a complete characterization
of the deception exponent. Since our definition of the decep-
tion exponent is equivalent to a special case of the guessing
exponent introduced in [19], the result also follows from [19].
Theorem 1: The deception exponent under the distortion
constraint D is
E(D) = max
Q
[
R(D,Q)−D(Q‖P)], (7)
where R(D,Q) is the rate-distortion function defined in (2)
and D(Q‖P) is the relative entropy between the type distri-
bution Q and the source distribution P.
The proof of Theorem 1, stated in the next section, is a
special case of a corresponding proof in [19] applied to the
authentication problem formulated here, and considering the
first moment only. Even though it follows directly from [19],
we include the proof for completeness. Achievability is proved
by constructing adversarial strategies based on different types
on X and relating the corresponding type classes to the rate-
distortion function using the type covering lemma [20]. The
idea in the converse is a proof by contradiction. That is, for a
given distortion constraint, we construct a rate-distortion code
using adversary’s strategy list followed by an entropy encoder
and assert that its rate cannot be smaller than the rate-distortion
function, otherwise it would contradict the converse of the
rate-distortion theory.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 [19]
A. Achievability
In this section, it is shown that for any distortion constraint
D ≥ 0, there exists a sequence of adversarial strategies {S(n)}
such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logEP
[
G(n)(Xn)
] ≤ max
Q
[
R(D,Q)−D(Q‖P)],
(8)
for every distribution P on X . This inequality gives an upper
bound on E(D).
The proof uses the following lemma referred to as the type
covering lemma in [20, Lemma 9.1]
Lemma 1: Let Q(n)(X ) denote the set of all types on X of
n-length sequences in Xn. Then, for any distortion measure
on X × Y , any type Q ∈ Q(n)(X ), and any distortion level
D ≥ 0, there exists a set B ⊆ Yn such that
d(n)(xn,B) := min
yn∈B
d(n)(xn, yn) ≤ D, (9)
for every xn ∈ TnQ , and
1
n
log |B| ≤ R(D,Q) + δ, (10)
where TnQ denotes the type class of Q (set of sequences of
type Q in Xn) and δ → 0 as n→∞.
This lemma allows us to divide the set of all types of n-
length sequences, which is the set of all possible guesses, to
smaller subsets for each type that can be described by the rate-
distortion function. Now, we proceed with the proof. For each
type Qk ∈ Q(n)(X ) with k ∈ {1, . . . , |Q(n)(X )|}, let Bk be
the corresponding set that satisfies the type covering lemma
above. We can now order the types in Q(n)(X ) with respect to
their values of rate-distortion function in an increasing order,
i.e., for the ordered list {Q1,Q2, . . . }, we have R(D,Qk) ≤
R(D,Qk+1).
The adversary’s strategy S(n) can be constructed as a
list which consists of ordered concatenation of the sets
{B1,B2, . . . }, corresponding to {Q1,Q2, . . . }. We have
EP
[
G(n)(Xn)
]
=
∑
xn∈Xn
Pn(xn)G(n)(xn)
=
|Q(n)(X )|∑
k=1
∑
xn∈TnQk
Pn(xn)G(n)(xn)
(a)
≤
|Q(n)(X )|∑
k=1
∑
xn∈TnQk
Pn(xn)
∑
k′≤k
|Bk′ |
(b)
≤
|Q(n)(X )|∑
k=1
exp
[
− nD(Qk‖P)
] ∑
k′≤k
|Bk′ |
(c)
≤
∑
Q∈Q(n)(X )
exp
[
− nD(Q‖P)
]
· exp
[
n(R(D,Q) + δ)
]
=
∑
Q∈Q(n)(X )
exp
[
n
(
R(D,Q)−D(Q‖P) + δ)]
(d)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | exp
[
n
(
R(D,Q)−D(Q‖P) + δ)], (11)
where
(a) follows from the definition of the counting function, i.e.,
its return value is at most the size of the strategy list;
(b) follows from [20, Lemma 2.6], i.e., for every type Q of
sequences in Xn and distribution P on X , we have
Pn(TQ) ≤ exp
[− nD(Q‖P)]; (12)
(c) follows from the type covering lemma in (10);
(d) follows from the type counting lemma [20, Lemma 2.2].
Taking the logarithms of both sides of (11), we obtain
1
n
logEP
[
G(n)(Xn)
] ≤ |X | log(n+ 1)
n
+R(D,Q)−D(Q‖P) + δ. (13)
Since the left-hand side is not dependent on the distribution
Q, taking the limit as n→∞ on both sides and the maximum
on the right-hand side over all possible distributions Q, we get
(8) which concludes the achievability proof.
B. Converse
In this section, we prove that for any arbitrary sequence of
adversarial strategies {S(n)} with distortion constraint D ≥ 0,
we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logEP
[
G(n)(Xn)
] ≥ max
Q
[
R(D,Q)−D(Q‖P)].
(14)
which provides us with a lower bound on E(D).
As described in [19] the term logG(n)(xn) can be thought
of as the codeword length for a lossless entropy encoder that
operates on the adversary’s strategy list S(n) with distortion
constraint D. Thus, the combination of the entropy coding and
the corresponding strategy list creates a rate-distortion code.
Consequently, the average codeword length per input symbol
(i.e., 1nEQ
[
logG(n)(Xn)
]
) with respect to a source distri-
bution Q cannot be smaller than the rate-distortion function
R(D,Q), cf. (2).
For a distribution Q defined on X , we have
EP
[
G(n)(Xn)
]
=
∑
xn∈Xn
Pn(xn)G(n)(xn)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
Qn(xn) exp
(
log
Pn(xn)G(n)(xn)
Qn(xn)
)
= EQ
[
exp
(
log
Pn(xn)G(n)(xn)
Qn(xn)
)]
(a)
≥ exp
(
EQ
[
log
Pn(xn)G(n)(xn)
Qn(xn)
])
= exp
( ∑
xn∈Xn
Qn(xn) log
Pn(xn)
Qn(xn)
+
∑
xn∈Xn
Qn(xn) logG(n)(xn)
)
(b)
= exp
(
− nD(Q‖P) +
∑
xn∈Xn
Qn(xn) logG(n)(xn)
)
,
(15)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and (b) is due to
the fact that the random variable X is i.i.d. and memoryless.
Next, define
λj :=
∑
xn∈Xn
s.t. G(n)(xn)=j
Qn(xn). (16)
Then, the second term of the exponential in (15) writes as∑
xn∈Xn
Qn(xn) logG(n)(xn) =
∑
j
λj log j. (17)
Now, we are going to use a lossless entropy code for positive
integers j = {1, 2, . . . } with probability distribution ρj = C()j1+
for a fixed  > 0. The constant C() is chosen such that
the probabilities satisfy
∑
j ρj = 1. The average codeword
length for this code is dlog2 1ρj e measured in bits [21], and
as mentioned earlier, this entropy code in combination with
the return value of the counting function of the enrollment
sequence xn (i.e., j = G(n)(xn)), resembles a rate-distortion
code. Thus,
R(D,Q) ≤ 1
n log2 e
∑
j
λjdlog2
1
ρj
e
≤ 1
n log2 e
∑
j
λj
(
1 + log2
j1+
C()
)
=
1
n
log 2 + (1 + )∑
j
λj log j − logC()
 ,
(18)
which leads to having∑
j
λj log j ≥ nR(D,Q)− log 2 + logC()
1 + 
. (19)
Substituting (19) and (17) in (15) and taking the logarithms
from both sides, we get
1
n
logEP
[
G(n)(Xn)
] ≥ −D(Q‖P) + R(D,Q)
1 + 
− log 2− logC()
n(1 + )
. (20)
Since the left-hand side is not dependent on the value of  and
the distribution Q, taking the limit as n → ∞ on both sides,
then the limit as → 0 on the right-hand side, and finally the
maximum over all possible distributions Q on the right-hand
side, we obtain (14). This completes the converse proof.
V. AUTHENTICATION WITH SIDE INFORMATION AT THE
ADVERSARY
Next, we consider an extension of the previous setup where
we assume that the adversary may have access to some
additional side information correlated with the enrollment. In
particular, consider a pair of i.i.d. random sequences Xn and
Zn generated with joint distribution P defined on X×Z . Here,
Xn represents the enrollment and Zn the side information
available at the adversary.
The adversary takes advantage of this side information to
impersonate the legitimate user by producing a guess of the
enrollment sequence xn that falls within the distortion limit
D. That is, for each measurement length n, the adversary has
a strategy S(n)Z (zn) ⊆ Yn which is an ordered set of n-length
guesses ynz (j) with j = {1, 2, . . . }, i.e.,
S(n)Z (zn) :=
{
ynz (1), y
n
z (2), . . .
}
. (21)
With this strategy, the adversary produces a sequence of
guesses until a guess ynz (j) is found such that
d(n)
(
xn, ynz (j)
) ≤ D, (22)
which leads to successful deception of the authentication
system.
The counting function G(n)(·|zn) of the adversary is now
defined as the function that, given the side information zn ∈
Zn, for each enrollment sequence xn ∈ Xn returns the index j
of the first guess ynz (j) ∈ SZ(zn) such that d(n)(xn, ynz (j)) ≤
D. If no such codeword exists, it returns G(n)(xn|zn) =∞.
Definition 2: The deception exponent with side information
at the adversary under the distortion constraint D is defined
as
EZ(D) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
min
S(n)Z
logEP
[
G(n)(Xn|Zn)]. (23)
♦
Similar to Section III, we have the following characteriza-
tion of the deception exponent with side information at the
adversary, which is again a special case of the results in [19]
applied to the authentication setting.
Theorem 2: The deception exponent with side information
at the adversary under the distortion constraint D is
EZ(D) = max
Q
[
RX|Z(D,Q)−D(Q‖P)
]
, (24)
where Q is a joint distribution defined on X × Z . The
term RX|Z(D,Q) is the rate-distortion function with side
information available at both the encoder and the decoder [22]
defined as
RX|Z(D,Q) = min
P(yz|x,z):E[d(X,Yz)]≤D
I(X;Yz|Z). (25)
This result can be proved with similar steps taken in the
proof of Theorem 1, paralleling the corresponding proof in
[19], using the rate-distortion function with side information
and the following extension of the type covering lemma, cited
from [19].
Lemma 2: Let Q(n)(X ,Y) denote the set of all joint types
on X×Y of n-length sequences (Xn, Zn) ∈ Xn×Zn. For any
distortion measure on X ×Y , any joint type Q ∈ Q(n)(X ,Y),
and any distortion level D ≥ 0, there exists a set BZ(zn) ⊆ Yn
such that
d(n)(xn,BZ(zn)) := min
ynz ∈BZ(zn)
d(n)(xn, ynz ) ≤ D, (26)
for every xn ∈ TnV (zn), and
1
n
log |BZ(zn)| ≤ RX|Z(D,Q) + δ, (27)
where δ → 0 as n → ∞. The notion TnV (zn) denotes the
conditional type class defined as the set of all sequences xn ∈
Xn having conditional type V given zn ∈ Zn, where xn and
ynz have a given joint type Q.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied performance limits in au-
thentication using information-theoretic arguments. The results
provide valuable insights for the design and security assess-
ment of an authentication system which is a key element in
modern information-based systems. In particular, we consid-
ered authentication in a system where an adversary tries to
launch an impersonation attack by guessing the enrollment
sequence of a legitimate user stored in the database. This
allowed us to apply the results from [19], which showed
a relation between the authentication problem and the rate-
distortion theory, and completely characterized the minimum
number of required guesses (on average) by the adversary for
a successful attack in terms of the deception exponent.
We note that our model addresses a passive authentication
system and an adversary with no knowledge of the legitimate
user. While in practice, the system can take a more active
role in the authentication process, e.g., by setting a limit
on the number of guesses, we believe that these results can
be used in the design of the authentication systems as they
characterize the minimum required complexity of an adversary
for successful deception in the system.
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